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Abstract 
Individual and company bargaining has increasingly supplanted sector and country collective 
bargaining leading to increasingly perforated and multi-layered national collective bargaining 
systems. In this paper, we develop a comprehensive categorization of bargaining and argue 
that both the bargaining level and the degree of integrative interaction between bargaining 
units matters for efficacy. This idea is tested using representative company level data for the 
European Union. We find that the efficacy of coordinated sector and multi-level systems is 
higher than for all other forms of bargaining. Policy implications are discussed as these results 
challenge current attempts to reform collective bargaining in Europe. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Interest in the efficacy, i.e. the functioning and impact, of different collective bargaining 
systems, i.e. different processes and institutional structures of collective bargaining, on the 
productivity of companies has (re-)gained both political and academic interest in recent years. 
This interest was triggered by the advent of the economic crisis in 2008, since the ability of 
some forms and structures of collective bargaining to provide flexibility for companies to 
maintain or increase their productivity and competitiveness was questioned in some countries 
(see, e.g., Addison 2015; Marginson and Welz 2015). 
Particularly in the European Union (EU), political interest in the efficacy of collective 
bargaining systems increased after the adoption of the Europe 2020 strategy in 2010, which 
aims at promoting “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” for the EU member states. A part 
of this strategy aims at fostering the productivity of European companies to enable them to 
compete successfully in the world market. While Europe 2020 does not directly refer to 
collective bargaining, several countries received recommendations to review their bargaining 
systems to ensure that labor costs, i.e. wages and working time arrangements, support 
competitiveness and productivity growth (see, e.g., European Commission 2011). 
Furthermore, political interest in the efficacy of collective bargaining increased in recent years 
after the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) included reforms of collective bargaining systems on the agenda of 
their Memoranda of Understandings (see, e.g., Marginson 2015; Marginson and Welz 2015), 
which are also reflected in policy and institutional reform recommendations for countries 
outside the EU (see, e.g., IMF 2015). In fact, reforms of collective bargaining systems were 
the predominant policy recommendations given by European and international organizations 
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(see Adascalitei et al. 2015). Due to this increase in the political relevance of collective 
bargaining systems, academic interest has also gained momentum in recent years.   
In academia interest increased as in many European countries “well known” national 
collective bargaining systems, which were characteristic of European countries for the second 
half of the 20th century (see, e.g., Crouch 1993), transformed into perforated, multi-layered, 
and complex systems of collective bargaining, i.e. hybrid systems. From a national 
perspective, these new systems of collective bargaining are characterized by the presence of 
different collective agreements, e.g. national, sectoral, and company agreements, within one 
country. It became a common characteristic in several countries that no agreement applies for 
some companies while other companies are covered by collective agreements on different 
levels and for some companies multiple collective agreements apply simultaneously. In 
addition, these systems are not stable over time as the type of collective agreements that apply 
might change due to reforms of collective bargaining systems. In any case, little is known 
about the efficacy of these systems of collective bargaining.1 In this paper we provide a 
comprehensive and in-depth investigation of the relationship between collective bargaining 
systems and company performance using cross-European micro data on the company-level. 
We depart from the existing literature in a number of ways. 
Firstly, previous research traditionally concentrated on the effects of collective bargaining at 
different levels, essentially looking at the effects of collective bargaining at company, sector 
or national level (see, e.g., Cameron 1984; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Calmfors 1993). A 
relatively small number of papers (see, e.g., Soskice 1990; Traxler 1995; Traxler, Blaschke, 
and Kittel 2001) also considered the degree of coordination between different bargaining units 
at the same or between different levels. Regarding the latter, the previous literature has also 
mainly focused on the interaction between two levels such as the existence of individual 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Eurofound (2014) and European Commission (2014) for a comprehensive overview of the 
transformation of national collective bargaining systems in Europe.  
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bargaining between employers and employees in addition to collective bargaining  (see, e.g., 
Dell’Aringa and Pagani 2007; Plasman, Rusinek, and Rycx 2007; Daouli et al. 2013, Boeri 
2014).  
Less attention was given to “hybrid” systems of collective bargaining, in which different 
collective bargaining arrangements can exist for different companies and sectors within a 
country, and multiple levels and forms of interactions between bargaining units exists.  
Given that political interest has also increased and any reforms of collective bargaining 
systems should be based on informed decisions and evidence-based (see, e.g., Carlin 2012) it 
is a timely exercise to assess the efficacy of the “hybrid” systems that have emerged over the 
last three decades in many European Union member states. However the efficacy of such 
“hybrid” systems was analyzed so far in the context of single countries’ transformations, 
characteristics and experiences (see, e.g., Granqvist and Regnér 2008; Daouli et al. 2013; 
Dustmann et al. 2014). This fact hinders any attempt at generalization, which is needed for 
any policy recommendations for other countries. Therefore, in contrast to the previous 
literature, this paper assesses and compares the effect on company productivity of different 
forms and processes of determining wages and working conditions which exist in the 
European member states. We do this on the basis of a fine-grained categorization which uses 
the three levels (company, sector, country) at which collective agreements were struck, the 
interaction of different bargaining units at the same level and between different levels, as well 
as whether different collective agreements are exclusive (i.e. there is only one agreement 
which is relevant for a company) or inclusive (i.e. different collective agreements on different 
sectors might apply to one company). In addition we consider and differentiate as to whether 
there is any form of coordination and inclusive interaction between collective bargaining 
units.      
Secondly, almost all seminal studies on the effects of collective bargaining which have 
covered a number of different country systems and allowed generalizations of their results 
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were predominantly macro-oriented (see, e.g., Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Soskice 1990; 
Traxler 1995; Flanagan 1999). In these studies hypotheses were tested using broad 
categorizations of country collective bargaining systems on the basis of the predominant level 
(and eventually degree of coordination) in a country. Consequently, any “hybrid” aspects of 
collective bargaining systems were either omitted, captured in a fuzzy manner, or just partly 
considered. In addition to this, sample sizes were often small, leading to problems with 
statistical power. In contrast, the quantity of data used in this analysis allows us to consider 
the wide heterogeneity and complexity of different bargaining systems that exist within 
countries and which is missed by purely macro studies that categorize countries based on the 
dominant bargaining regime. Therefore, in comparison to previous studies, our results provide 
a much more detailed micro-picture of how different bargaining regimes relate to firm 
productivity, permitting a more finely-grained empirical and theoretical analysis.  
The article is organized into six parts. In the first section we provide an overview of the 
heterogeneity of collective bargaining systems in the EU. We then review the relevant 
literature on the efficacy of collective bargaining systems and derive our theoretical 
arguments and hypotheses. Afterwards, we present the methodological and empirical strategy 
for testing the hypotheses and then consider the results. The paper concludes by discussing the 
implications of our study in the context of current attempts to reform collective bargaining in 
the EU. 
 
II. The Diversity of Collective Bargaining Systems in the EU 
 
There are commonalities as well as wide differences across the EU member states in how 
wages and working conditions are set (see, e.g., Aumayr-Pintar et al. 2014; European 
Commission 2014). On the one hand, all countries have some elements of collective 
bargaining in addition to individual agreements, which is hardly surprising given that the 
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principle of free, independent and voluntary collective bargaining is a cornerstone of the 
governance of labor in the EU (see European Commission 2014). On the other hand, there are 
substantial differences among countries both in terms of the coverage of collective 
agreements and in the specific processes and institutional structures of collective bargaining 
in different countries.  
Collective bargaining coverage in the EU ranges from under 20 percent of employees in 
countries such as Lithuania, Latvia and Poland to over 80 percent in countries such as Italy, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Finland, France, Austria and Belgium. In the latter 
two countries, collective bargaining coverage is almost 100 percent (for detailed country data 
and information see European Commission 2014). Countries also differ in the institutional 
structure of collective bargaining. First, countries differ in the “traditional” and dominant 
level of collective bargaining, i.e. whether the majority of covered employees fall under 
company (decentral), sector (intermediate) or national (central) collective agreements.2 In the 
majority of countries, sector agreements are predominant, while in a few (i.e. Belgium and 
Finland) national and in others (i.e. Ireland, Romania, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Malta, and the UK) company agreements are predominant. Second, 
countries also differ with respect to the degree of coordination and governability of collective 
bargaining in case different bargaining units exist.3 We refer to “coordination” when looking 
                                                
2 A distinct level at which collective bargaining takes place is defined as dominant, according to the definition of 
the European Commission (2014), if at least 2/3 of the total number of employees covered by any collective 
agreement fall within this level.  
3 A collective bargaining unit usually consists of two parties: employers and employees representative 
organizations. Such units can exist on different levels. Employee organizations are usually trade unions 
organized either on a company, sector or national level. On the employer side, employer organizations usually 
exist on a sectoral or national level, while a company’s management would be responsible for company-level 
agreements. In some countries, bargaining units also include state representatives. For an overview see Aumayr-
Pintar et al. (2014), European Commission (2014). 
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at the interaction between bargaining units at the same level (horizontal interaction), such as 
one sector’s agreement serving as reference for agreements in other sectors (for example, 
wage leadership) and use “governability” to describe the interaction between units at different 
levels (vertical interaction), such as whether company level agreements can diverge from 
sector agreements under specific circumstances and/or within specific ranges and for distinct 
issues. In some studies the term coordination is used for both types of interaction (see, e.g., 
Kenworthy 2006; European Commission 2014). However, similar to Traxler (1995) and 
Brandl (2012) we differentiate between the two dimensions as they represent two distinct 
forms and aspects of a collective bargaining system which are formed by different interaction 
structures and mechanisms which operate independently from each other.  
In terms of coordination, we refer to a bargaining system as uncoordinated if different units 
on the same level, i.e. horizontally, act independently from one another. This system is 
prevalent in the majority of European countries and essentially implies that each unit 
negotiates for itself without considering agreements made in other units. We refer to a 
coordinated system of collective bargaining, if units interact in an integrative way with other 
units either in formal cooperation meetings or via informal norms, such as sectoral wage 
leadership. Both the formal and informal institutional and procedural coordination 
mechanisms differ between countries but exist in a number of EU member countries such as 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
In terms of governability, we call a system non-governed if units on different levels in a 
multi-level bargaining system4 act independently from one another. However if there is some 
form of integrative interaction between different levels we will refer to a governed system. 
These exist in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Slovenia. Similar to coordination, countries differ in the 
                                                
4 We use the term multi-level bargaining as in some systems multiple (i.e. two or three) levels exist on different 
dependent or independent “tiers” or “layers”. 
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institutional form, processes and scope of governability. In some countries, the scope of 
lower- level bargaining is determined by higher-level agreements. For example it is common 
in some countries that higher-level agreements are used to set wages, but leave many other 
working conditions to be negotiated at a lower level. Another example of a governed system 
is one where higher-level agreements define specific corridors for negotiations of wages at 
lower levels. Such types of governed systems are characteristic of Nordic countries. We also 
consider a system to be governed when there is state intervention in bargaining, which is 
characteristic of France. Another form of governability is that central peak trade union and 
employers’ associations define rules and regulations for their constituent organizations, for 
example whether derogations from higher level collective agreements at lower levels such as 
company level agreements deviating from sectoral agreements are allowed or whether lower 
levels can opt out of collective agreements. The purpose of such derogations is to enable 
lower level bargaining flexibility, but details again differ between countries. Austria and 
Germany for example usually allow derogation only in cases when individual companies face 
(well defined) economic hardship. Another example of differences between countries is the 
extent to which in melius derogation is permitted i.e., lower level deviations from agreements 
which are worse for employees. Regulations on in melius derogations are common in many 
EU countries. Even in these countries it is often possible to derogate for working conditions, 
either because it is more difficult to judge which side is favored by a certain change or 
because derogation in favor of the employer side, i.e. in pejus, is allowed.5 For an overview of 
the integrative interaction of collective bargaining units and the respective country 
classification outlined here and used in the analysis see Aumayr-Pintar et al. (2014) and 
                                                
5 An example for the latter can be found in the Germany system of collective bargaining. For example it is 
possible for normal working hours to be increased to 45 hours at company level but the conditions on when and 
how this is possible are defined on the sectoral level. For details see Eurofound (2016). 
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European Commission (2014). For detailed information on the coordination and governability 
mechanisms and institutions see Traxler et al. (2001). 
 
III. The Effects and Performance of Different Systems of Collective Bargaining 
 
A major focus in the literature has been the efficacy of collective bargaining systems, i.e. the 
ability of systems to produce beneficial outcomes, such as for example low unemployment, 
inflation and labor cost growth and high economic and productivity growth, via wage and 
labor cost moderation.6 A key issue in theoretical discussions has been the extent to which 
collective bargaining takes the economy’s and society’s wider interests into account when 
negotiating for wages and working conditions. For example, excessive wage increases signed 
by a collective bargaining unit for its domain,7 i.e. for a group of workers, are generally 
considered to be beneficial for the workers covered by the collective agreement, but might 
                                                
6 In the following we will outline the theoretical debate on the relationship between different collective 
bargaining systems and productivity growth of companies by referring to seminal and recent literature. In this 
literature different outcome indicators are used (e.g. wage growth, unemployment growth, inflation, etc.). 
However, all these different indicators, including productivity growth, are in general two sides of the same coin 
and are usually considered to be beneficial. In order not to switch back and forth in the theoretical debate with 
different indicators we are using the term beneficial outcomes as a synonym for the variety of outcome 
indicators.    
7 A collective bargaining unit usually consists of two parties, i.e. the employers and the employees. Depending 
on the domain, e.g. for a specific company, sector, region, or country, employers and employees are represented 
by different organizations, e.g. sector employers’ organization and union on the sector domain or peak level 
trade unions and employers’ association for the national domain. In some collective bargaining systems the state 
is also included as a third party. When state authorities are involved in collective bargaining, this is 
predominantly found in bargaining at the national domain. For detailed information on the composition of 
different bargaining units in the EU member states see Aumayr-Pintar et a. (2014), Eurofound (2015), 
Marginson and Welz (2015).     
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create externalities for others such as inflationary pressures on the whole economy and/or 
make it harder for unemployed workers to be hired. This is particularly true if the bargaining 
unit is wide ranging and a high share of the workforce is covered and affected by the 
agreement. Earlier literature focused mainly on the level at which bargaining takes place. One 
early theoretical argument in favor of bargaining at higher, more centralized levels, such as 
whole nation-states, has been that a wider range of interests are covered by the agreement 
simply because a larger number of workers (in extreme cases the whole work force of a 
country) are covered by it. This implies that all the costs and benefits of the collective 
agreement are internalized and there is no way to externalize any costs to other units or parties 
in the economy (see, e.g., Traxler and Brandl 2009). For example, in this case a union would 
also de facto negotiate for unemployed workers, effectively internalizing their interest in the 
negotiation. Thus, the higher the level at which collective bargaining takes place, the more 
likely the mutual interests of all members of the economy are achieved (see Cameron 1984; 
Bruno and Sachs 1985).  
Calmfors and Driffill (1988) challenged the previous theoretical reasoning. They convincingly 
argued that in decentralized bargaining systems, where bargaining takes place at a company 
level, competitive pressure between companies would ensure market efficient outcomes from 
collective bargaining. In particular, market pressures ensure wage moderation in the sense that 
labor costs do not increase unsustainably thus keeping a company’s productivity 
developments in line with market developments. Consequently, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
argue in favor of a non-linear (hump-shape) relationship between the degree of centralization 
and beneficial bargaining outcomes, where both centralized and decentralized bargaining 
systems lead to an appropriate level of wage restraint. Bargaining at intermediate levels such 
as sectors leads to less beneficial outcomes because at competitive pressures between sectors 
fall short to overcome the cartelizing effect that sectoral bargaining exerts. This enables the 
costs of excessive wage increases to be spread across other sectors to the whole economy and 
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society, while the benefits, in the form of higher wages, are only felt by the sector employers 
and employees.  
As this appealing theoretical idea did not fully match with empirical evidence (see, e.g., 
OECD 2004), the later literature in addition started to recognize the importance of 
coordination between bargaining units for the efficacy of collective bargaining systems to 
achieve beneficial outcomes. For example, Soskice (1990) argued that a system where lower 
level collective bargaining is coordinated can work as a functional equivalent to centralized 
collective bargaining and is associated with similar beneficial outcomes, as different units at 
the same level, say sectors, are coordinating their mutual interests and goals in bargaining and 
are not externalizing the costs to other units. Research on the coordination of collective 
bargaining also started to consider further contextual factors, such as the interaction of 
collective bargaining with other policy areas, for example monetary policy, or the 
organizational structure of bargaining units involved  (see, e.g., Calmfors 1993; Iversen 
1998). In particular the form and degree of horizontal and vertical integrative interaction 
between different bargaining units, i.e. the extent to which bargaining units take into account 
the interests of the economy and society as a whole was increasingly considered in theoretical 
debates.  
The theoretical arguments on the sectoral cartelizing effect of collective bargaining hold 
mainly in the context of a closed economy. For open economies, especially in tandem with a 
fixed exchange rate as in the European Monetary Union, the situation becomes more complex 
as only some bargaining units might now be able to externalize costs. For example, sheltered 
sectors or companies might be able to externalize some of the costs while sectors exposed to 
international competition have to bear the burden of the bargaining costs of the sheltered 
sectors. There is evidence that (uncoordinated) sectoral collective bargaining in some 
countries with an open economy is indeed associated with an inferior efficacy (see, e.g., 
Traxler et al. 2001). But, as argued by Traxler and Brandl (2012), the efficacy of sectoral and 
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multi-level bargaining systems in open economies is not necessarily inferior but depends on 
the ability of bargaining units to pursue a strategy of mutual interest. They argue that the 
efficacy rationale of multi-unit bargaining systems is mainly an organizational coordination 
and governability question between different units. Faced with interest cleavages between 
different units, e.g. sectors and companies, which are asymmetrically exposed to international 
competition and sector or company specific “shocks”, there is the need to unify conflicting 
interests so that long-term mutually beneficial interests are optimized. This implies choosing a 
strategy and form of integrative interaction between units that serves as a functional 
equivalent to central level bargaining and favors all or at least the majority of bargaining 
units. In order to develop a functional equivalent to central level bargaining, an integrative 
interaction between units at different and/or at the same level via a coordination and 
governability of collective bargaining is needed. However, an integrative interaction in both 
horizontal and vertical directions can be procedurally, institutionally and organizationally 
different in different countries and periods. For example, integrative interaction between 
sectoral bargaining units materializes in pattern bargaining such as in Austria and partly in 
Germany where one sector sets a pioneer agreement that serves as an anchor and reference for 
(all) other sectors. Another example of an integrative interaction between different units is 
when state authorities are governing, i.e. imposing, the scope and range of collective 
bargaining issues and outcomes for units at different levels such as partially exists in countries 
such as Belgium and France. A further form of integrative interaction, which is characteristic 
of some Nordic countries, is central level peak employers’ and union associations governing 
the scope and range of collective bargaining at lower levels.8 Even though the institutional 
and legal framework of an integrative interaction of bargaining units differs across countries, 
                                                
8 For details on different forms of integrative interaction between collective bargaining units in advanced 
economies see for example Traxler et al (2001), Brandl (2012), European Commission (2014). 
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what matters is that it materializes in a functional equivalent of centralized collective 
bargaining and is associated with the same theoretically beneficial effects.  
In the following we will derive a classification of collective bargaining systems which exists 
in the member states of the EU and analyze their efficacy in terms of their ability to achieve 
beneficial economic outcomes. The categorization will differentiate, first, between different 
levels of collective bargaining, second, whether multiple levels exist simultaneously and third 
if bargaining units at the same and/or on different levels are interacting in an integrative way 
or not. On the basis of this classification we are able to test the hypothesis of whether 
company level bargaining, integrative multi-unit bargaining, and national level bargaining 
systems are associated with a higher efficacy as compared to all other systems.      
 
IV. Data and Modelling Strategy 
 
In our empirical analysis we focus on three key aspects of collective bargaining systems: the 
level of bargaining (where we distinguish between national, sectoral and company-level 
bargaining), the degree of horizontal coordination and the degree of vertical governability of 
bargaining. The definition of low and high governability follows Traxler et al. (2001) and 
Brandl (2012) who define and differentiate bargaining systems on the basis of the legal, 
associational, formal and informal framework of collective bargaining regarding the ability to 
govern the outcome of bargaining by different units at different levels. Systems with high 
governability are characterized by the ability of higher level bargaining units, usually peak 
and central-level employers’ organizations and trade unions, to impose restrictions and rules 
on the outcome and topics of lower level bargaining. In general, the efficacy of governability 
depends on legal and associational defined regulations but also procedural on the number of 
units. Basically, any form of integrative interaction becomes increasingly difficult the more 
bargaining units exist. Our definition of coordination follows the concept of Kenworthy 
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(2001) which is augmented by Aumayr-Pintar et al. (2014) and which differentiates between 
bargaining systems on the basis of the legal, associational, formal and informal framework of 
collective bargaining regarding the ability to coordinate the outcome of bargaining by 
different units at the same level. 
The data we use for the classification and analysis come from the 2013 wave of the European 
Company Survey (ECS), see Eurofound (2015). The ECS collect company-level data based 
on interviews with human resource managers and employee representatives. The ECS was 
collected in spring 2013 across 32 countries, including all current 28 EU member states, and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Turkey. For reasons 
of data availability on wider contextual factors which must be controlled for, our analysis 
concentrates on the 28 EU member states. We use data on all other aspects of the wider 
collective bargaining system i.e. employment relations, system from European Commission 
(2014) and for the macroeconomic context from European Commission (2013) in order to 
guarantee consistency between different data sets. 
The data is representative for businesses and organizations with 10 or more employees and 
thus enables us to test our hypothesis on a comprehensive sample of different collective 
bargaining systems. The sample size for our estimation sample is 22,008 companies with 
individual country samples between 256 (Malta) and 1,439 (Italy). Most importantly for our 
research question, the ECS contains detailed information about coverage by national, sectoral 
and company-level collective agreements for each company. We combine this information 
with country-level information on governability and coordination to arrive at our fine-grained 
classification of bargaining systems across Europe. In total we consider four types of single 
level bargaining, specifically company, coordinated sector bargaining, uncoordinated sector 
bargaining, national bargaining, six types of two level bargaining (company and sector, 
company and national, sector and national, each governed and ungoverned) and two types of 
three level systems, namely (un-)governed company, sector and national agreements. Our 
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reference category is purely individual bargaining between the employer and employee, 
leading to a total of 13 categories, which is the most comprehensive and fine-grained 
classification considered in the literature so far as it explicitly differentiates between all 
existing levels and combinations of levels and interactions.9  
As an outcome and indicator for the efficacy of collective bargaining systems we use changes 
in labor productivity from 2010 to 2013, measured in three categories, “increased, 
“decreased” and “remained the same”. In most specifications, we collapse this into a single 
dummy variable taking the value “1” if labor productivity increased. This choice of the 
dependent variable offers some advantages over other commonly used measures. Macro-level 
cross country studies usually use performance indicators such as (nominal and real) wage 
increases, unit labor costs, (un)employment, inflation, taxation, and (wage) inequality (see, 
e.g., Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Soskice 1990; Wallerstein, Golden, and Lange 1997; Iversen 
1998; Flanagan 1999; Traxler et al. 2001; Addison and Belfield 2004; Johnston and Hancké 
2009; Baccaro and Simoni 2010; Brandl 2012; Johnston 2012; Murtin, de Serres, Hijzen 
2014). In micro studies, wage related indicators such as nominal wage levels, increases, wage 
premium, wage dispersion and excess wages are used as performance or outcome measures 
(see, e.g., Hartog, Leuven, and Teulings 2002; Rycx 2003; Cardoso and Portugal 2005; 
Plasman et al. 2007; Fitzenberger, Kohl, and Lembcke 2008; Dahl, le Maire, and Munch 
2013; Daouli et al. 2013; Boeri 2014). In contrast, we evaluate the performance of collective 
bargaining systems by the ability of the relevant actors to sign collective agreements on wages 
                                                
9 A further differentiation would have been theoretically possible as company level bargaining could be 
coordinated as well, but this system does not exist in any EU member state. It would also be possible to 
differentiate further by categorizing multi-level systems along coordination and governability. However, this 
would increase the number of categories to 19 and would lead to extremely low observation numbers for some 
categories leading to unreliable estimates. For these reasons we do not consider a further differentiation in the 
following analysis. 
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and working conditions that lead to a labor costs development enabling productivity growth of 
the companies affected by the agreement. Even though fewer studies used productivity as an 
outcome indicator (see, e.g., Addison and Hirsch 1989), we prefer productivity growth over 
wage growth and wage level indicators for a variety of reasons.  
First, collective bargaining is not exclusively about wages but also about working conditions 
such as working time (including hours of work, rest periods, work schedules and flexible 
work), remuneration forms and schemes (including wage and non-wage benefits and 
bonuses), innovation and organizational change regulations, as well as vocational training 
agreements which do not all influence wages but will have an impact on company 
productivity (see, e.g., Nergaard et al. 2009; Addison et al. 2013; Voss, Schöneberg, and 
Rodriguez Contreras 2015). Taking only wages into account as an outcome of collective 
bargaining would miss the effects of these regulations on working conditions, even though 
they are significant cost and investment factors and potentially influence the productivity of 
companies considerably. Second, what is important for the “success” of companies is their 
productivity development and not necessarily the development of their employees’ wages. As 
a matter of fact, depending on the wage setting mechanism employed by a company, e.g. 
efficiency wages (see, e.g., Akerlof and Yellen 1986; Krueger and Summers 1988), the link 
between wage levels and wage increases and productivity is highly complex so that 
(excessive) wage increases do not necessarily hinder the productivity of companies. For 
example, in multi-level collective bargaining systems in which a favorability principle (in 
melius) regarding wages exists, it is inevitable that any additional collective agreement leads 
to higher wages (see, e.g., Hartog et al. 2002; Rycx 2003; Cardoso and Portugal 2005; 
Plasman et al. 2007; Dahl et al. 2013, Daouli et al. 2013; Boeri 2014). However, while wages 
are necessarily higher in multi-level systems, ceteris paribus, company productivity might not 
necessarily be negatively affected. In fact, productivity might even increase as non-wage 
issues which matter for productivity are regulated in the collective agreement (see Windolf 
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1989), but also because the higher wages of such multi-level systems could impose 
(efficiency) wage effects which translate into productivity increases in some companies (see, 
e.g., Levine 1991; Lazear 1995; Hibbs and Locking 2000). Thus, productivity growth is not 
only the more comprehensive efficacy indicator of collective bargaining compared to wage 
growth or any other wage indicator, but also the most valid. Finally we prefer productivity 
growth as an indicator because it is explicitly mentioned as a direct success factor in political 
debates such as the Europe 2020 strategy. Thus it enables us to directly link our results with 
current political debates and to inform policy goals. 
 
(Table 1 about here.) 
 
Table 1 presents an overview of the prevalence of all bargaining systems in the EU, how 
widespread these systems are across the member states, as well as descriptive information on 
the share of companies reporting increases in productivity in each category. The largest group 
in our sample (i.e. 37%) are companies without any collective bargaining, which are also 
present in each EU country. In these companies, wages and working conditions are set 
exclusively by individual agreements between the employer and the employees. Individual 
bargaining is followed by the various types of single-level bargaining which total a share of 
42%. Two and three-level systems are less common, but exist in 20% of all companies in the 
EU. As regards the number of agreements at different levels, the majority are signed on a 
company level, followed by the sectoral level and then the national level. This ranking is 
consistent with other sources (see, e.g., European Commission 2014) even though the number 
of national level collective agreements is relatively high. The latter can be explained by some 
respondents treating social pacts, i.e. ad hoc agreements between national (peak) level 
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employers’ associations, trade unions, and the government, as collective agreements, while 
other sources such as the European Commission (2014) categorize social pacts separately.10  
Comparing the number of single and multi-level agreements, it is striking that that every third 
collective agreement nowadays is a multi-level agreement. This could be interpreted as an 
indicator for a process of decentralization of collective bargaining leading to an increase in 
the number of company agreements in addition to higher level agreements which still prevail 
in many countries. It is also striking that all these systems are not exclusive to specific 
countries or smaller groups of countries. In fact, we have not one single country in which only 
one single system of collective bargaining exists. Rather national systems are rather 
characterized by a perforated landscape of collective agreements struck by different units at 
different levels. This, as well as the fact that in 20% of all companies a multiple-level 
bargaining system exists, indicates the current hybrid nature of national collective bargaining 
systems in the EU. 
Examining productivity increases across the different categories reveals large differences 
across the different bargaining systems. While these are clearly unconditional differences that 
may be influenced by other variables, they are at least suggestive of some link between 
bargaining systems and productivity. Importantly for our analysis, the descriptive results also 
suggest that productivity increases differ depending on governability and coordination, even 
within otherwise identical bargaining systems.  
In the next step, we evaluate whether these productivity differences persist when introducing 
various sets of controls and conducting various types of robustness checks. We begin by 
simply regressing a dummy for productivity increases on the full range of bargaining system 
                                                
10 Whether social pacts are collective agreements is largely a matter of definition and there are reasons in favor 
and against a differentiation (see, e.g., Brandl 2012) but in fact it is difficult for respondents in companies to 
differentiate between them. 
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dummies using linear regression.11 We then introduce various control variables in blocks, 
beginning with industry dummies and various other company characteristics such as 
membership in an employer organization, the presence of a union representative, 
establishment size (3 dummies), public/private sector, dummies for being a company 
headquarter or a subsidiary site, presence of a works council and (grouped) shares of 
employees with open ended contracts, with university degrees, who are female, who work 
part-time and who are in highly-qualified jobs. Subsequently, we introduce a fairly 
comprehensive set of macro variables to control for all kinds of country differences. This set 
of macro controls are the change in log GDP from 2010 to 2013, the current tax burden 
(change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 2013), the average share of exports and imports in 
world trade (change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 2013), log of the total labor force in 2013, 
real unit labor costs for the total economy (change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 2013), the 
harmonized consumer price index (change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 2013) and 
respective exchange rate with the Euro (change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 2013). All 
these variables correspond to the set of variables used in relevant macro studies on the 
efficacy of collective bargaining systems. Finally, in a last specification, we replace the macro 
variables with country fixed effects, thus capturing all observed and potentially unobserved 
factors differing between countries. It is important to be clear that this last specification is 
likely to miss a large part of the effects of interest: Governability and coordination vary 
essentially between different countries but not within them, while the presence of country 
fixed effects means that the effects are identified using differences in bargaining systems 
across companies within countries. While this fact will likely drive results towards zero, this 
specification is still an interesting benchmark case as it likely represents the lowest possible 
bounds for the effects of interest. 
                                                
11 We also calculated Probit marginal effects. Estimates are essentially identical. 
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In a second step, we re-estimate the specifications using the original (ordinal) variable and 
ordered probit regressions. These estimates confirm our earlier results. Finally, we conduct a 
range of additional robustness checks in relation to our classification of countries in terms of 
coordination and Governability. In a first robustness check, we explore additional 
classifications of countries, which are sometimes suggested in the literature. In another 
robustness check, we test whether the results are heavily influenced by the presence of a 
single country by dropping each country in turn and re-estimating our model. We then present 
summary results on the distribution of coefficients across these estimates. 
 
V. Results 
 
Table 2 presents the basic regression results. We start the discussion of the results with 
specification (1) which includes the full set of control variables and proceed then to 
alternative specifications in order to investigate the robustness of our results. An important 
result is that a large share of the coefficients appears to be qualitatively unaffected by the 
inclusion of various control variables across columns (1) to (4). This is reassuring as it 
suggests that the potential for omitted variable bias is comparatively small. The inclusion of 
country fixed effects in column (5) predictably reduces the size and significance of the 
estimated coefficients to about 40-50% of those in column (1). However, even in this 
specification, the vast majority of coefficients retain their sign as well as their relative size in 
relation to each other. This also underlines once again that all multi-level collective 
bargaining systems which include the sectoral level of bargaining are associated with a 
significantly superior efficacy. 
 
(Table 2 about here.) 
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Looking at the results reveals that across specifications the share of companies with 
productivity increases is significantly higher if they fall into the domain of company-level, 
coordinated sector, national and governed sector and company, governed sector and national, 
ungoverned company and national, and governed three level collective agreements, compared 
to companies which are covered by no collective agreement. Uncoordinated sector bargaining 
in turn is associated with a significantly lower share of companies experiencing productivity 
increases. However, the positive effect on companies’ productivity, i.e. the efficacy of 
collective bargaining systems, is highest for governed three-level bargaining systems and for 
the governed two-level systems which include sectoral bargaining.  
These results fit our theoretical considerations regarding single level collective bargaining 
systems. National level bargaining and company level bargaining are associated with 
beneficial outcomes with a slightly better efficacy of national bargaining, which is also in line 
with theoretical considerations of the Calmfors and Driffill (1988) hypothesis. However, as 
regards the efficacy of sectoral systems, the claim made by Soskice (1990) and Traxler (1995) 
that it is necessary to consider whether there is an integrative interaction between bargaining 
units, apparently has merit. Not only does the efficacy of coordinated sector bargaining 
systems outperform all other single level systems, but governed multi-level systems which 
include sector bargaining are also characterized by a high degree of efficacy. However, these 
results also show that uncoordinated and ungoverned multi-level systems fail to be positively 
associated with the productivity development of companies and might in fact even be 
negatively related. By comparing the estimates from (1) with the estimates in specifications 
(2) to (4), the robustness of the positive efficacy effects of the coordinated sector bargaining 
system, and of all governed multi-level systems which include the sectoral level, as well as 
the negative efficacy for uncoordinated sectoral bargaining is confirmed. For several other 
types of bargaining systems the results are less clear-cut. Depending on the specification, 
ungoverned multi-level systems are associated with either a worse or similar efficacy than 
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having no collective agreement. Also the robustness of the positive efficacy of company and 
national bargaining is contested. Again, these results are plausible in light of the theoretical 
reasoning as in (3) company specific controls mitigate the effects of company bargaining 
effects and the effects of national level bargaining need controls for the national 
macroeconomic context which is missing in (4).  
 
(Table 3 about here.) 
 
The previous analysis has mainly focused on the productivity increases of companies. In 
principle, it could be possible that this specification misses important changes that occur at the 
productivity remaining the same vs. declining margin. Table 3 repeats our analysis using all 
three categories of the outcome variable using ordered probit regressions. Positive coefficients 
in this specification imply “better” productivity changes. 
As we can see from Table 3 there are indeed some changes, mainly that company and national 
bargaining become insignificant. At the same time the main result in relation to the multi-
level systems and the importance of coordination and governability remain. The inclusion of 
fixed effects renders some effects insignificant, however, these estimates should be treated 
with caution as non-linear models such as ordered probits are generally less efficient than 
linear models and many of the properties of fixed effects do not translate easily from linear 
models. 
 
(Table 4 about here.) 
 
In our analysis we categorize collective bargaining as governed or ungoverned as well as 
coordinated or uncoordinated on the basis of coordination and governability mechanisms that 
are observable in different countries. As mentioned earlier, the legal and contextual 
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framework of these mechanisms varies across countries so that any classification of countries 
is not necessarily always clear cut. Even though our classification of coordination and 
governability is based on widely accepted sources (see Aumayr-Pintar et al. 2014; European 
Commission 2014: Traxler et al. 2001), there are some borderline cases. Specifically, Greece, 
Italy, and Spain can be classified differently in terms of the degree of coordination, while the 
same can be said for Belgium regarding the degree of governability. For Belgium, this doubt 
arises because of the regional division of collective bargaining. The potential fuzziness of the 
classification of Greece, Italy, and Spain is mainly due to the fact that in all three countries 
(relatively) strong centralized features of centralized and thus of coordinated bargaining exist, 
but these do not always materialize in full, comprehensive and wide ranging coordination due 
to a high fragmentation of the trade union and employers’ association system in these 
countries. In addition, in all three countries collective bargaining institutions were reformed 
during the time the ECS data was collected, leading to more emphasis on the role of 
deregulated collective agreements. This means that the degree of integrative interaction 
between units in these countries is not adequately reflected in the sources we used for 
classification. For this reason Table 4 explores the robustness of results with respect to an 
alternative classification of countries in terms of coordination and governability.   
While there are some changes in significance across specifications, for example, for the 
negative coefficient for ungoverned sector and national bargaining which becomes significant 
in some specifications, the main results remain very similar to those in Tables 2 and 3. 
Specifically, coordinated sector bargaining as well as governed multi-level bargaining 
systems are associated with more favorable labor productivity development than having no 
collective agreement; while uncoordinated sector bargaining und ungoverned multi-level 
systems that involve sectoral bargaining tend to have worse labor productivity development.  
 
(Table 5 about here.) 
 24 
 
Table 5 presents the results from a final robustness check which considers the extent to which 
specific countries are potentially driving the results. We re-estimate our models omitting all 
observations from each country in turn. The table presents summary results from these 
estimates, specifically the average coefficient, the median, minimum and maximum 
coefficient and the percentage of estimates where the coefficient was significant. The results 
essentially confirm our main results from the previous tables. Coordinated sector bargaining, 
governed multi-level systems involving sector bargaining and ungoverned multi-level systems 
not involving sector bargaining are always positively related to labor productivity 
improvements and are always significant. On the flipside, uncoordinated sector bargaining is 
always associated with lower labor productivity improvements. All other results are 
somewhat mixed, although national bargaining is usually significant and positively related to 
labor productivity improvements. 
Taken together, the results present a coherent picture across a range of different specifications 
and samples. The effect of collective bargaining on company productivity growth depends 
heavily on the integrative interaction between collective bargaining units on the same and on 
different levels.12 In fact, this holds for single and multi-level systems. On a sectoral level 
coordinated collective bargaining is significantly associated with a higher number of 
companies reporting productivity increases compared to all other single level systems. 
Moreover, all multi-level collective bargaining systems involving the sectoral level 
outperform all other categories in terms of productivity. This includes two and three level 
systems and is in line with previous country studies on the efficacy of collective bargaining 
(reforms). For example these results here confirm the efficacy assessment of the German 
collective bargaining system analyzed and discussed by Dustmann et al. (2014) as Germany is 
                                                
12 This is confirmed by the (Wald) joint significance test reported in Table 2 of all multi governed bargaining 
systems. 
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predominantly characterized by governed two-level systems, coordinated sectoral bargaining, 
and company bargaining next to individual bargaining. Even though the performance 
indicator differs, the results here also confirm other country studies (see, e.g., Granqvist and 
Regnér, 2008) as it shows that the Swedish system, in which governed two and three level 
bargaining is prevailing, has the ability to perform well in terms of increasing the productivity 
of companies.  
Although the results of this study correspond with recent studies and evidences, they also   
challenge fundamental theoretical hypotheses for various reasons. The Calmfors and Driffill 
(1988) hump-shape thesis for instance argues that the relative advantage of specific systems 
of collective bargaining lies either in the capacity of bargaining units to exploit the labor cost-
moderating effect of centralized bargaining or in the need to minimize labor costs because of 
exposure to (international) competition. This theoretical reasoning must be reconsidered as 
centralized, i.e. national bargaining, is not found to be associated with the highest 
performance compared to other systems. In fact, when coordinated, sectoral systems are 
associated with an even higher performance compared with company, national, and individual 
bargaining.  
These results also amend the theoretical reasoning that multi-level systems are associated with 
the worst performance of all bargaining systems (see Boeri 2014) as our results show that the 
performance of multi-level collective bargaining systems is dependent upon the integrative 
interaction of bargaining units between the levels, i.e. upon the governability of the system. 
Indeed, our results suggest that integrative interaction is the key element for the efficacy of 
collective bargaining systems. On the one hand, the results here show that multi-level 
bargaining systems under low governability perform worst because they combine all the 
disadvantages of possible sector cartelizing effects and free riding incentives of bargaining 
units. On the other hand, the results show that if multi-level systems are governed, they have 
the potential to outperform all other bargaining systems as they incorporate the need to 
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internalize the costs and benefits of their outcomes as well as enable bargaining units at 
different levels to adopt and adjust bargaining outcomes to unit and domain specific 
circumstances. These results on the performance of coordinated and governed collective 
bargaining systems are generally consistent with the reasoning by Soskice (1990) and Traxler 
(1995) for national collective bargaining systems in a macroeconomic framework of analysis. 
However, given that the organizational and structural framework of collective bargaining has 
changed significantly in the past three decades as national systems have transformed into 
hybrid systems and fuzzy national bargaining “regimes”, there was the need to adjust the 
theoretical and empirical framework. This has necessarily lead to a revision of previous 
evidence and reasoning on the one hand but a validation and confirmation of others.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we argued that the structural framework of collective bargaining in Europe is 
characterized by the presence of a diversity of collective systems. These systems differ in the 
sense that collective bargaining takes place at different levels either exclusively on specific 
levels or combined at different levels. In addition, collective bargaining systems differ 
regarding the integrative interaction between different bargaining units at different levels and 
domains. Given that various bargaining systems are observable across EU member states, 
national bargaining landscapes provide a perforated and complex, i.e. hybrid, picture. As little 
is known about the efficacy of these systems of collective bargaining, this paper provides a 
detailed analysis of the impact of these systems on company productivity.  
The analysis was based on a fine-grained categorization of distinct collective bargaining 
systems which are observable in the EU member states. It was explained how the key 
components of collective bargaining systems, i.e. the level and the degree of integrative 
interaction at the same and on different levels, affects the performance of companies which 
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was measured by increases in companies’ productivity. We argued that company productivity 
is a preferable and valid measure of the efficacy of collective wage bargaining systems as it 
captures not only the impact of agreements on wages but also on non-wage issues, such as 
working conditions, which form an important part of collective bargaining. It was 
hypothesized that centralized, company level, as well as coordinated and governed multi-level 
systems of collective bargaining are associated with a superior performance relative to other 
systems. The efficacy of the distinct systems of collective bargaining was tested on the basis 
of micro-level, i.e. company data, from the 2013 European Company Survey. As the dataset 
used is not only comprehensive but also representative for the EU, it allows us to achieve a 
high degree of generalization of the results, which confirms but also rejects some of our 
hypotheses. On the one hand, we had to revise the idea that company and national level 
bargaining systems are associated with the highest performance. Our analysis provided strong 
and robust empirical evidence that coordinated sectoral bargaining and governed multi-level 
bargaining systems are associated with an even higher efficacy than company and national 
bargaining. On the other hand, we were able to confirm that any form of integrative 
interaction between collective bargaining units at the same level as well as on different levels 
is a key factor for the efficacy of collective bargaining.  
In fact, coordinated sector collective bargaining (as for example still common in Austria), 
governed company and sector bargaining (as for example common in Germany), and 
governed national, sectoral, and company level bargaining (as for example common in Nordic 
countries) are associated with a superior performance compared with other systems of 
collective and individual bargaining. Company and individual bargaining systems (as for 
example common in the Central and Eastern European Countries and in the UK) are 
associated with an “average” performance compared to all other categories. Systems with the 
worst performance were identified as those for uncoordinated sectoral and non-governed 
multi-level systems (as for example common in some peripheral countries of the EU). Our 
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results are robust in controlling for a wide-range of company and country-level variables and 
across a wide range of empirical specifications. 
These results also provide evidence on the success of past and current policy 
recommendations provided by policy making institutions and authorities in the context of 
current attempts to reform collective bargaining. Most notably this applies to 
recommendations under the umbrella of the EC new economic governance and the Europe 
2020 strategy, as well as to policy recommendations given by international organizations such 
as the IMF. Nearly all policy recommendations in this context were geared towards fostering 
and strengthening company collective bargaining and individual bargaining (see, e.g., 
Marginson 2015). For a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe this led to the 
disappearance of any forms and structures of sectoral and national collective bargaining. In a 
number of other countries, especially in Southern Europe, this lead to the introduction or 
strengthening of supplementary levels of collective bargaining (see, e.g., Eurofound 2014). 
However, both developments are “sub optimal” in the light of the results presented here. In 
the case of the abolishment of any sectoral and national agreements, the performance which is 
“achievable” by these reforms is only “average” compared to other possible reforms, as 
company bargaining and individual bargaining are clearly outperformed by coordinated 
sectoral bargaining and governed multi-level bargaining systems. When collective bargaining 
is reformed towards a multi-level system in which, for example, sectoral bargaining is 
widened and complemented by company bargaining, the performance of the reform depends 
upon the ability of units to interact in an integrative way. On the one hand, if the reform leads 
to an ungoverned multi-layer bargaining system, the performance of this system can be 
expected to be worse. On the other hand, if the reform is flanked by governability 
mechanisms, the reform is likely to succeed in a first best solution.  
Given that past reforms and transformations of collective bargaining systems in the EU were 
predominantly geared towards the strengthening of company bargaining without any attention 
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to the coordination and governability of collective bargaining, our analysis suggests that past 
reforms and current recommendations and reforms have resulted in a second best, or 
sometimes even a dampening efficacy. As this study uses not only the most comprehensive, 
fine grained analysis of current hybrid systems of collective bargaining in the EU, but also the 
most generalizable data set, the conclusion for informed policy making is that the “standard” 
reform agenda should be reconsidered and more attention must be paid to the integrative 
interaction of bargaining units.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1  
Bargaining Systems and Labor Productivity 
Bargaining system Number of observations/companies % of observations % with productivity increase System present in … countries 
Individual bargaining 8,182 37.2 48.4 28 
Single level systems 
Company bargaining 3,869 17.6 51.1 28 
Coordinated sector bargaining  2,029 9.2 53.3 9 
Uncoordinated sector bargaining 1,331 6.0 36.6 19 
National bargaining 2,113 9.6 40.0 28 
Multi level systems 
Two level systems 
Governed company and sector 636 2.9 60.0 6 
Ungoverned company and sector 885 4.0 43.7 22 
Governed company and national 138 0.6 54.4 6 
Ungoverned company and national 557 2.5 45.1 21 
Governed sector and national 521 2.3 63.3 6 
Ungoverned sector and national 649 2.9 40.1 20 
Three level systems 
Governed company, sector and national 404 1.8 65.1 6 
Ungoverned company, sector and national 694 3.1 45.5 21 
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Table 2  
Base Estimates, Dependent Variable: Increase in Labor Productivity from 2010 to 2013 
(1 = Yes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Company 
bargaining 
0.018* 0.029*** 0.008 0.027*** 0.011 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Coordinated sector 
bargaining  
0.064*** 0.078*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.018 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) 
Uncoordinated 
sector bargaining 
-0.046*** -0.034** -0.111*** -0.118*** 0.011 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
National bargaining 0.035** 0.041** -0.070*** -0.084*** 0.015 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Governed company 
and sector 
0.119*** 0.134*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.055** 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
Ungoverned 
company and sector 
-0.027 -0.003 -0.067*** -0.047*** 0.014 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Governed sector 
and national 
0.127*** 0.156*** 0.130*** 0.149*** 0.062** 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) 
Ungoverned sector 
and national 
-0.015 -0.006 -0.074*** -0.084*** 0.014 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Governed company 
and national 
0.025 0.049 0.031 0.059 -0.049 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) 
Ungoverned 
company and 
national 
0.048** 0.070*** -0.047** -0.034 0.045** 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
Governed 
company, sector 
and national 
0.127*** 0.156*** 0.135*** 0.167*** 0.064** 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) 
Ungoverned 
company, sector 
and national 
0.004 0.028 -0.043** -0.029 0.033 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Observations 22008 
R2 0.066 0.042 0.052 0.015 0.077 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Company-level 
controls 
Yes No Yes No Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes No No No 
Country fixed 
effects 
No No No No Yes 
 Tests of joint significance (p-values) 
Governed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
Ungoverned 0.069 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.229 
NOTE.-Coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote statistical significance on the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
Company level controls are membership in an employer organization, the presence of a union representative, 
establishment size (3 dummies), public/private sector, dummies for being a company headquarter or a subsidiary 
site, presence of a works council and (grouped) shares of employees with open ended contracts, with university 
degrees, who are female, who work part-time and who are in high-qualified jobs. 
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Macro controls are change in log GDP from 2010 to 2013, the current tax burden (change from 2010 to 2013 and 
level in 2013), the average share of exports and imports in world trade (change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 
2013), log of the total labor force in 2013, real unit labor costs for the total economy (change from 2010 to 2013 
and level in 2013), the harmonized consumer price index (change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 2013) and 
respective exchange rate with the Euro (change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 2013). 
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Table 3  
Ordered Probit Estimates, Dependent Variable: Change in Productivity from 2010 to 
2013 (positive values indicate positive productivity changes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Company bargaining 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Coordinated sector bargaining  0.10*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.11*** -0.00 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Uncoordinated sector bargaining -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.38*** -0.39*** -0.02 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
National bargaining 0.02 0.04 -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Governed company and sector 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.08 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Ungoverned company and sector -0.10** -0.03 -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.01 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Governed sector and national 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.10 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ungoverned sector and national -0.07 -0.05 -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.01 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Governed company and national -0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.07 -0.21* 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Ungoverned company and national 0.06 0.12** -0.23*** -0.18*** 0.05 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Governed company, sector and 
national 
0.26*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.36*** 0.10 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Ungoverned company, sector and 
national 
-0.06 0.00 -0.20*** -0.16*** 0.00 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 22008 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Company-level controls Yes No Yes No Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes No No No 
Country fixed effects No No No No Yes 
NOTE.-Coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote statistical significance on the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
Company level controls are membership in an employer organization, the presence of a union representative, 
establishment size (3 dummies), public/private sector, dummies for being a company headquarter or a subsidiary 
site, presence of a works council and (grouped) shares of employees with open ended contracts, with university 
degrees, who are female, who work part-time and who are in high-qualified jobs. 
Narrow macro controls are the change in log GDP from 2010 to 2013, the change in current tax burden from 
2010 to 2013 and the change in the respective exchange rate with the Euro from 2010 to 2013. 
Macro controls are change in log GDP from 2010 to 2013, the current tax burden (change from 2010 to 2013 and 
level in 2013), the average share of exports and imports in world trade (change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 
2013), log of the total labor force in 2013, real unit labor costs for the total economy (change from 2010 to 2013 
and level in 2013), the harmonized consumer price index (change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 2013) and 
respective exchange rate with the Euro (change from 2010 to 2013 and level in 2013). 
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Table 4  
Robustness Checks for Country Classifications 
 Base (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Company bargaining 0.018* 0.014 0.015 0.010 0.007 0.012 0.011 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Coordinated sector 
bargaining  
0.064*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.052*** 0.045*** 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) 
Uncoordinated sector 
bargaining 
-
0.046*** 
-
0.069*** 
-
0.073*** 
-
0.057*** 
-
0.054*** 
-
0.046*** 
-
0.070*** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
National bargaining 0.035** 0.033** 0.035** 0.023 0.024* 0.033** 0.034** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Governed company and 
sector 
0.119*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.081*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Ungoverned company and 
sector 
-0.027 -0.031* -0.029 -
0.047*** 
-
0.061*** 
-
0.060*** 
-
0.061*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
Governed sector and 
national 
0.127*** 0.118*** 0.121*** 0.088*** 0.050** 0.097*** 0.096*** 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Ungoverned sector and 
national 
-0.015 -0.019 -0.016 -0.040* -0.048** -
0.084*** 
-
0.082*** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
Governed company and 
national 
0.025 0.017 0.020 0.018 0.002 0.032 0.034 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Ungoverned company and 
national 
0.048** 0.045** 0.047** 0.035 0.036 0.027 0.027 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
Governed company, 
sector and national 
0.127*** 0.120*** 0.122*** 0.076*** 0.066*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Ungoverned company, 
sector and national 
0.004 -0.001 0.002 -0.018 -0.031 -0.035 -0.036 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
N 22008 
R2 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.065 0.064 0.065 0.065 
NOTE.-Coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote statistical significance on the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. 
The base specification is specification 1 from Table 2. (1) changes Italy and Spain to coordinated. (2) changes 
Italy, Spain and Greece to coordinated. (3) sets Belgium to governed. (4) sets Belgium, Italy and Spain to 
governed. (5) sets Belgium, Italy, Spain and Greece to governed. (6) combines (2) and (5). 
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Table 5  
Leave-one-out Estimates, Summary Estimation Results 
Variable Avg. 
coefficient 
Median 
coefficient 
Minimum 
coefficient 
Maximum 
coefficient 
% of 
estimates 
where 
coefficient 
is 
significant 
Company bargaining 0.017 0.017 0.012 0.025 14 
Coordinated sector 0.061 0.062 0.043 0.073 100 
Uncoordinated sector -0.043 -0.045 -0.051 -0.016 93 
National bargaining 0.032 0.032 0.022 0.043 79 
Governed company and 
sector 
0.117 0.117 0.103 0.144 100 
Ungoverned company and 
sector 
-0.024 -0.024 -0.041 -0.007 4 
Governed sector and 
national 
0.124 0.125 0.104 0.143 100 
Ungoverned sector and 
national 
-0.015 -0.015 -0.057 0.018 4 
Governed company and 
national 
0.020 0.021 -0.064 0.058 0 
Ungoverned company and 
national 
0.049 0.050 0.034 0.058 86 
Governed company, sector 
and national 
0.125 0.127 0.109 0.140 100 
Ungoverned company, 
sector and national 
0.006 0.005 -0.007 0.025 0 
NOTE.-Summary results based on 28 estimates of specification (1) from table 2, each omitting all companies 
from one country. % of estimates where coefficient is significant is rounded to the nearest full percentage point. 
 
